Set transaction-file access by role
Give each person access to the transaction files needed for an assigned task, with separate decisions for reading, editing and sharing. Review the person’s transaction assignment as well as their role, and remove access when that assignment ends. A fictional five-role model shows how those decisions can be made explicit without granting everyone the same folder.
Start with a task and an owner
Write down the work the person is doing before selecting a permission. “Coordinates this transaction” is more useful than “needs access,” because it gives the file owner something concrete to approve. The FTC recommends restricting access to people with a legitimate business need and limiting administrative access.1 Use that principle to ask what information the task actually requires.
For a shared checklist, a coordinator might need to update who is preparing a document without reading every attachment. A client might need to read a shared status list and supply their own file without seeing the other party’s uploads. These are example design decisions, not legal rules. If access depends on a contract, statutory duty or disputed entitlement, a licensed professional decides that question before the workspace settings are changed.
Choose a responsible person to approve each exception. Record the transaction, file or collection, permitted action, reason and review point. A title such as “broker” is not sufficient by itself: the person also needs an assignment to this particular transaction. Avoid a permission request whose scope is simply every current and future file.
Separate the information before assigning roles
Our original example contains five fictional collections: a shared task list, a buyer upload, a seller upload, coordination notes and an internal review. It stores no documents or personal information. The table shows the collections each role can read after applying the model’s explicit grants.
| Fictional role | Readable collections | Important boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Buyer | Shared tasks; buyer upload | Cannot read seller upload |
| Seller | Shared tasks; seller upload | Cannot read buyer upload |
| Assigned agent | Shared tasks; both uploads; coordination notes | Cannot read internal review |
| Assigned coordinator | Shared tasks; coordination notes | Cannot read either upload |
| Assigned broker | All five collections | Has no automatic permission to reshare uploads |
Use the table to discuss the shape of access, not to copy a universal brokerage policy. In another workflow, a coordinator could have a documented reason to receive a particular upload. That would be a new, explicit grant with its own check. The example deliberately avoids inferring access from the convenience of placing everything in one folder.
For your own planning sheet, give sensitive collections recognizable labels without writing the sensitive contents into the sheet. Keep internal discussion separate from a status summary intended for clients. The checklist adaptation guide can help distinguish task labels from the underlying material that people may need to handle.
Treat reading, editing and sharing as different actions
In the model, the agent can read the buyer upload but cannot replace it. The buyer can edit that upload but cannot read the seller upload. The coordinator can edit shared tasks without reading either upload. Those distinctions are visible in the complete local results.
Sharing receives its own decision. The fictional broker can share the task list, but no role can reshare either upload through the model. That is an explicit example boundary, not a statement that real products prevent downloading or forwarding. The runner has no account system, file storage, public links or enforcement layer; it calculates whether a fictional action is permitted.
When translating an approved plan into a real service, inspect the actual controls for each action. Do not use the word “viewer” as a substitute for reading that service’s current documentation. Ask separately whether the plan needs reading, replacement, editing, resharing or administration, and record anything the service cannot separate. Do not assume a setting has been applied merely because it appears in a planning table.
Check both the allowed and denied cases
The public example and commands reproduce the model. Its checks cover ordinary allowed work as well as attempts that should fail. A buyer reads their own upload and is denied the seller’s. A coordinator edits tasks and is denied the uploads. An agent is denied the internal-review collection even though that agent can read other material.
The remaining checks exercise boundaries that a role table alone can hide. Unknown roles, unlisted collections and undefined actions are denied. An inactive coordinator is denied the shared list. A broker assigned to a different fictional transaction is denied the internal review. All 20 expected results matched when the local code ran; that result describes this code and these cases only.
An engineer adapting the example should add a denied case whenever adding a grant. For instance, a new read permission for one assigned coordinator needs a corresponding case for an unassigned coordinator. Keep these checks fictional. Running them in this local model does not require creating client accounts, inviting anyone or entering real documents into a demonstration.
Review access when an assignment changes
The FTC’s access-control guidance emphasizes limiting sensitive information to people who need it for their work.2 Treat departure or reassignment as a reason to review that need. Identify the departing person’s transaction assignments, approved collections and any sharing permissions before handing work to a replacement.
In this model, setting the coordinator’s assignment inactive causes a denial before individual file permissions are considered. That demonstrates one rule order, not how a platform handles already issued links, downloaded files or active sessions. Those are separate questions for the service owner and its current documentation. Do not describe a removed role as proof that every previous copy or access route has disappeared.
Record what changed and what remains unverified. Use a new explicit assignment for the replacement rather than silently reusing the former person’s identity. The FTC’s broader guidance supports separate credentials and limiting service-provider access to what the work requires.1 The article does not set a retention period or determine which records must remain available.
Handle an unexpected file without widening exposure
If a shared link reveals material you did not expect, stop exploring the collection and tell the known file owner through an established contact. Describe the link and the type of unexpected access without forwarding the material to more people. Ask the owner to review the recipient and permissions; do not test how many additional files the link can reach.
The owner can then investigate the actual service, using authorized access and its documentation. Record the concern without making a claim that this local model diagnosed the incident. A question about breach obligations or legal entitlement belongs with a qualified professional. A suspicious change to payment instructions needs the separate process in closing-wire verification.
Not covered on this page
- Legal rights to documents or brokerage recordkeeping duties.
- Platform-specific permissions, public-link behavior or session revocation.
- Recovery of downloaded or forwarded copies.
- A security audit, compliance finding or production authorization system.
Sources
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Start with Security: A Guide for Business. FTC, August 2023; read 25 October 2026. ↩ ↩2
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Stick with Security: Control access to data sensibly. FTC, August 2017; read 25 October 2026. ↩
Code on this page is original and MIT licensed.
How we test: methodology. Found a mistake? Corrections.