Verify changed closing wire instructions

How-to Last checked 25 October 2026

If closing wire instructions change by email, pause the payment and verify the instructions through a contact route you established independently of that message. Do not use its reply address, phone number or link as the verification channel. If money has already been sent to a suspected fraudulent account, call the originating bank at once and file an IC3 complaint as soon as possible that same day, whatever the amount12.

Stop the payment while the change is checked

Do not let a closing-day deadline turn a surprising email into an instruction to act. A message can look familiar because a sender address was imitated or because a legitimate account or email conversation was compromised. The FBI describes both kinds of business-email compromise3. Correct spelling, familiar names and an existing conversation are therefore not enough to establish that the request is genuine.

Keep the suspicious message available for the appropriate people to examine, but do not open an unexpected attachment or follow its payment link. Do not send a reply asking the same account whether its new instructions are correct. That would leave the verification inside the channel that caused the concern.

Tell the agent or designated closing professional, through an independently established route, that the payment is paused while a change is checked. Describe what arrived and when. You do not need to diagnose whose account was compromised before asking for help; that question can remain unresolved while the immediate payment decision is held.

Use the contact you established earlier

Establish the contact route before closing. The CFPB’s archived 2019 blog advises agreeing on trusted contacts in advance; current FBI guidance supports confirming payment changes in person or by calling through a number you obtained independently43. Prepare that route while there is time to check it carefully, rather than finding the supposed verification number in a last-minute payment message.

An incoming call claiming to be the closing office does not solve the problem. End the call and initiate contact through the independently known route. If your established contact is unavailable, keep the transfer paused and ask the office through a separately verified channel how to reach the appropriate person. A new number supplied by the suspicious sender is still part of the unverified request.

For a team, distinguish the person tracking the callback from the person authorized to confirm the instructions. An agent or coordinator can help make the handoff visible without acting as an account-validation service. Do not treat a colleague’s forwarded email as a substitute for the confirmation process you arranged with the responsible professional.

Enable two-factor or multi-factor authentication on email and financial accounts wherever it is offered; the FBI advises using it on every account that supports it3. Do not email financial information such as account credentials or personally identifying payment details. The archived CFPB post gives the closing-specific warning, and IC3 also advises against emailing credentials or personally identifying information42.

Ask about the change itself

Explain that you received changed wiring instructions and need to confirm the payment details through the established process. Ask the responsible contact to resolve the discrepancy before sending anything. IC3 specifically recommends a secondary channel for requests that change account information1. The aim is to verify the intended recipient’s instruction, not merely to receive a reassuring response from someone who knows the transaction.

An original fictional example makes the difference clear. A buyer receives an email saying a receiving account has changed. The buyer calls the contact number established earlier, identifies the unexpected request and asks the responsible closing contact to resolve it. The buyer does not read a phone number from the new email, call it and treat that call as independent confirmation.

If two contacts give conflicting answers, stop there and ask the responsible office to reconcile them. Record the unresolved question and who is handling it. Do not choose whichever answer makes the appointment easier to keep. This page cannot validate an account or determine whether any particular set of instructions is legitimate.

Keep a minimal coordination note

Use a short note to help the team avoid duplicate or contradictory actions: the time the suspicious request arrived, the role handling verification, the established channel used and whether the discrepancy remains open. Keep payment credentials and the original message in the approved secure location, not in a general task list or public discussion.

For the fictional buyer, the note might say that the changed instruction is awaiting confirmation from the designated closing contact. It should not say “safe to wire” merely because someone left a voicemail. The next action remains with the identified person until the agreed process is completed. Any later change needs its own verification rather than inheriting the status of an earlier instruction.

The transaction workflow guide explains how to separate a requested action from a received response. That distinction is useful here, but a checklist is only a coordination aid. It does not authenticate a person, secure an email account or approve a payment.

If funds were sent, call the bank and report it today

Call the originating bank at once using an independently known number. Ask for an urgent recall or reversal and for a Hold Harmless Letter or Letter of Indemnity, as IC3’s BEC guidance directs1. Ask the sending bank to contact the receiving institution too3. Do not wait for the rest of the closing team to finish investigating.

Have the transfer information available for the bank’s own process: when it was sent, the amount and the transaction reference. Follow the bank’s instructions about how to supply sensitive details. Keep notes of the time you called and the reference it provides. These are steps for requesting help; a recall request is not a promise that the funds will be recovered.

Inform the legitimate closing participants through the known contact routes so they can respond within their own responsibilities. Avoid circulating the suspicious email broadly or announcing an unverified accusation about who caused the incident. A factual account of what was received and what was sent is more useful than a guess about the source.

File the IC3 complaint as soon as possible today

File at the official IC3 site as soon as possible, whatever the amount lost. Its 11 September 2024 alert stresses urgency: IC3 may be able to help financial institutions and law enforcement freeze funds2. The bank call and the complaint are both same-day actions; do not put the complaint off while waiting for a bank investigation.

If the matter is time sensitive, contact local law enforcement directly. If anyone is in immediate danger, call 911 or local police5.

The IC3 FAQ lists transaction details, recipient information, an account of what happened and email headers when available as useful complaint information5. Distinguish what you know from what you suspect.

Keep original supporting material securely; IC3 does not accept attachments. Save the complaint copy before leaving the confirmation page. You will not hear from IC3 about your complaint: its FAQ says complaints may be forwarded to other agencies, which decide whether to investigate5.

IC3 will never directly contact you for information or money. Anyone contacting you claiming to be IC3 is a scammer; report the impersonation through the official IC3 site. IC3 also says it does not work with private firms to recover funds6. Use independently known bank and reporting channels, and involve the organization’s security team if a business account may be compromised.

Not covered on this page

Sources

  1. IC3: Business Email Compromise. Publisher update date not established; observed 2026-10-25. Checked 25 October 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. IC3: Business Email Compromise—The $55 Billion Scam. Published 2024-09-11. Opened 25 October 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. FBI: Business Email Compromise. Publisher update date not established; observed 2026-10-25. Checked 25 October 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  4. CFPB: Mortgage Closing Scams—How to protect yourself and your closing funds. Archived blog post, published 2019-06-03; may be outdated. Checked 25 October 2026. Current FBI and IC3 guidance also supports the retained advice. ↩ ↩2

  5. IC3: Frequently Asked Questions. Publisher update date not established; observed 2026-10-25. Checked 25 October 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. IC3: official complaint-intake site and impersonation warning. Publisher update date not established; observed 2026-10-25. Checked 25 October 2026. ↩

How we test: methodology. Found a mistake? Corrections.